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I. F. Stone's Weekly

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The South Begins A Strategic Retreat

A brief glance back at the history of Negro voting in the South may serve to deflate the wild expansion of hope blown up by the peaceful admission of 21 Negroes to 7 white schools in Virginia. This is not the decisive battle of a great war; it is only the beginning of a long drawn out delaying action. The South is turning to token compliance rather than to massive resistance. Where the latter tends to provoke frontal clashes with the Federal government which the South cannot win, the former may lull Northern opinion to the point where real integration of schools may be indefinitely delayed.

The Negro's right to vote has an older and firmer foundation than his right not to be segregated at school. His right to vote is based upon a constitutional amendment a century old, explicitly forbidding any State to abridge or deny voting rights "on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude." One evasive device after another has been stricken down in the courts. But by and large there has been no more than token compliance, enough to reward a few "good" Negroes, to exploit their votes when necessary and to show enough compliance to refute the charge of unconstitutionality.

College Profs But Not Literate Enough to Vote

In education, as in voting, the Northern liberal must not mistake the letter of the law for the realities of Southern life. Literacy tests, upheld by the Supreme Court long ago as "not on their face" discriminatory, make it possible to this very day for Negro college professors to be disfranchised by white registrars who can only read by moving their lips. An analogous device, school placement statutes, allowing pupils to be assigned to various schools on the basis of morals, culture, family background, health, etc., are beginning to provide a "non-racial" means of maintaining segregation. The Federal courts, in the Alabama case, have already ruled that such statutes are "not on their face" discriminatory, and review was denied by the Supreme Court on November 24.

Where such statutes or similar devices serve to keep all Negro students out of white schools the task of proving them discriminatory and unconstitutional will be easy. But where Southern States, as in North Carolina and Virginia, are willing to allow some token integration, the task of proving that any specific Negro child has *really* been refused admission to a white school on racial grounds will be difficult. Every application for admission will require prolonged litigation because each time it will be necessary to prove all over again that the placement act is being used for purposes other than its stated non-racial reasons.

If the pace of integration is to depend on expensive and burdensome suits by individual Negro plaintiffs of meagre means, helped by an NAACP which is already effectively outlawed in much of the South, it will be slow enough to placate all but the most senseless racist. Just as the Negro who wants to register faces all kinds of extra-legal difficulties and obstacles so does the Negro parent who dares think of sending his child to a decent white school. It is worth recalling that of the five original school appeals decided by the Supreme Court almost five years ago, the two from the deep South—Clarendon County, South Carolina, and Prince Edward County, Virginia—are still lost somewhere in a fog of interminable legalisms and the fear created by white supremacists.

Cunningly Constructed Legal Labyrinths

School placement acts plus token defiance are formidable unless the Federal government is authorized to take the initiative in working with local school boards to draw up and to enforce plans of integration. This is what the new Douglas bill S. 810, the Civil Rights Act of 1959*, would do. As an enlightened North Carolinian summed it up in a speech cited by Senator Douglas in introducing his bill January 29, "A lone Negro child, seeking a right under the Constitution, a qualified person seeking to register to vote, a skilled and qualified workmen seeking a job—these must not be left to pit their puny strength against the massed power of a State." Without the Douglas legislation, even those private litigants who dare to risk economic boycott and physical threat will find themselves in a cunningly constructed labyrinth, a legal rat's race in which their funds and patience may be drained away long before they have "exhausted their administrative remedies" and qualified for admission to the final lap in the Federal courts.

"Conciliation" Can Be Evasion

On this fundamental issue both our "Presidents" are evasive. Mr. Eisenhower continues to pass the buck to the courts with all an old soldier's facility for dodging unpleasant duties; this is whence the word "soldiering" and the phrase "soldiering on the job" are derived. Our other "President", Lyndon Johnson, would palm us off with a plan for "conciliating" the problem. But conciliation will work best when and where the Negro has some more effective power to enforce his rights. The Douglas bill would have the Federal government shoulder the responsibility for this noble task of giving the Negro full citizenship at last, and making the name America shine out in its old splendor. Must a nation as great as ours depend for its honor on the courage of a few Negro children, willing to walk that fearsome path to school alone, while our leadership cowers in its plushy foxholes?

***Also sponsored initially by Humphrey (Minn.), Hennings (Mo.), Case (N. J.), Morse (Ore.), Clark (Penna.), Allott (Col.), Neuberger (Ore.), McNamara (Mich.), Javits (N. Y.), Proxmire (Wis.), Beall (Md.), Hart (Mich.), McCarthy (Minn.), Dodd (Conn.), Pastore (R. I.), and Carroll (Col.).**

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The Case Against Atomic Arms for Germany and for Disengagement in Central Europe

Text of Geo. Kennan's Statement Feb. 4 to Humphrey Disarmament Committee

A. Questions of Arms Control

1. There are weighty and cogent reasons which militate generally against the success of any effort to bring about the reduction and control of armaments by formal international agreement, particularly multilateral agreement, and why history, though affording plenty of examples of efforts in this direction, records few successful ones, except where the weapons in question were obsolescent or particularly inhuman, or where the political incentive to military competition had already been removed. But beyond these general difficulties, there are certain special inhibitions and fears which now burden the chances for any progress towards arms control by agreement.

In Russia, the chief difficulty lies in two phenomena, both deeply rooted in Russian statesmanship of the Tzarist as well as the Soviet period; first a passion for secrecy and an extreme, often unreasoned, fear of any foreign observation of life and conditions within the country; secondly, the habit of maintaining ground forces on a massive scale, exceeding any visible requirement of external defense. The first of these phenomena complicates at every turn questions of inspection and enforcement of any conceivable agreements on arms controls; the second helps to produce so great a disparity in size between Soviet and Western ground establishments that it becomes difficult to find any workable criteria for mutual reduction of such forces. About these conditions, there is little we can do at this time.

2. There are, however, certain similar abnormal rigidities in our own position which also deserve attention.

First, we have allowed military costs and administrative procedure to develop in such a way that it is difficult for us to maintain in peacetime anything more than a relatively small ground establishment. This means that we have little to offer, as a bargaining counter, in any negotiations looking to the reduction or limitation of ground forces. By maintaining too small a conventional force, in other words, we contribute to the disparity that complicates agreement, just as the Russians contribute to it by maintaining too large a one.

Secondly, precisely because we have convinced ourselves that we could not compete in the development of conventional forces, we have allowed ourselves to become dependent, in our planning and calculations, on atomic weapons, and have committed ourselves to the first-use of such weapons in any serious military encounter, whether or not they are used against us. Aside from the fact that these weapons now have virtually suicidal implications, so that a war in which both sides used them would be a catastrophe in itself, this staking of our defense policy on atomic weapons has placed us in a position where we could not accept abolition of the weapon even if our major adversaries, who have repeatedly invited us to join in its general abolition, were to offer us the most ideal facilities for inspection as a means of assuring ourselves of their good faith in such a move.

We are thus barred from progress in the control of conventional armaments by the extreme disparity in size between our *conventional* establishments and theirs. And we are barred from going very far in the direction of reduction or limitation of *atomic* armaments by the fact that we would, as things stand today, feel ourselves dependent on the continued cultivation of such armaments and on their use in the event of war, even if our adversaries had dispensed with them entirely.

3. These observations lead me to conclude that the element in our own posture in matters of disarmament which requires most careful re-examination is the question of our own military costs and of the reasons why we are unable, for the amount we spend, to maintain a larger combat force.

In the absence of the creation by this country of a much stronger conventional establishment, I see little chance of progress in negotiation for control of armaments, beyond the testing of atomic weapons.

B. The Relation of Arms Control to European Security

While there is extensive interaction between armaments and political issues in the development of international conflict, it is my view that it is the political issues which are basic; that armaments are more apt to be a function of political disagreement than vice versa; and that, accordingly, efforts to reduce tensions by seeking agreement on armaments, while leaving the political issue unresolved, are not hopeful.

Nevertheless, I must point out that in the present instance, certain developments, notably the decision to introduce atomic missiles and tactical weapons into the NATO defenses on the European continent, the trend toward the extension of the atomic capability to other western powers beside the U. S. and the U. K., and, particularly, the organization and training of the West German armed forces in a manner which practically implies their use and possession of atomic weapons at a later date, all operate to heighten greatly Soviet nervousness about the unresolved German problem, and complicate the solution of that problem. If, therefore, means could be found to alter this trend of western policy, or at least to hold out the possibility of such alteration as a part of a suitable settlement of the German question and the problem of European security, it would in my opinion have a useful political effect.

C. Soviet Intentions

1. The concept of Soviet intentions which is common in this country and which underlies much of our public discussion appears to assume that what we are faced with in Moscow is not only a single mind, but also a mind already made up, committed, and not importantly to be influenced by what we may or may not do. I disagree with this view. I believe that Soviet policy is the product not of any single mind, but of many; that these are not always in agreement and that Soviet policy often represents a compromise between them; that Soviet intentions change as the world situation develops; and that our own actions and attitudes are an important determinant of them.

2. With these reservations I can say that I do not believe that the Soviet leaders want another major war, or that they would be likely to inaugurate one by surprise attack just because they felt that they had a temporary advantage in long-range striking power. There is only one contingency in which I believe that they would consider such an attack; and that is if a situation were to arise which caused them to feel that major war between themselves and the United States was both inevitable and imminent. In this case we should expect them to take any and all measures that might seem suitable to them, including the exploitation of the element of surprise, in order to reduce to a minimum the dangers which such a major war could involve for them. I think, therefore, that it ought to be a constant aim of our statesmanship to see that no such situation develops.

3. It is my belief that the Soviet government regretted the introduction of atomic armaments into the world balance of power and was, until recently at least, sincere in the desire to see them abolished and eliminated from national armaments, although unwilling to provide adequate facilities for inspection. As Soviet military plans and dispositions become, under present conditions, increasingly centered around atomic weapons, rigidities will also be created on the Soviet side which will be adverse to any elimination of these weapons from national arsenals; and this has no doubt happened to some extent.

Nevertheless, it is my belief that the Soviet government would still prefer, on balance, to see these weapons eliminated from the scene. The cost of their cultivation represents a heavier burden on the Soviet economy than is commonly supposed in this country.

4. In any negotiations looking to the elimination of atomic weapons, the Soviet leaders would not be likely to grant us inspection facilities that would give us complete protection against clandestine violations of the agreement on their side. On the other hand, I do not feel that this means that there might not be agreements on this subject that would be profitable and acceptable to both parties. In the long run, the reliability of agreements on the control of armaments will always depend primarily on the political and psychological climate in which they operate; and the best security we can have against violation will be not the inspection provisions themselves, which can never be wholly foolproof, but the absence of incentive to violation.

5. The first and immediate concern of the Soviet government with respect to Germany is to bring about an alteration, in their favor, of the situation of Berlin. The Soviet leaders feel that the present situation there has become a serious obstacle to the consolidation of their political position in Eastern Europe, and in some ways a threat to their political security. They consider that they have it in their power to make the Western position in that city an awkward one if the Western powers decline to agree to a new status of Berlin which would render the city less of a thorn in the communist side. I do not think the Soviet leaders want war over Berlin; but they are prepared in this instance, for reasons not fully apparent, to play particularly close to the edge; they have committed themselves extensively; and it would not be wise for the West to take the matter too lightly.

6. With regard to more long-term problem of Germany in general, the main Soviet concern is to assure:

a. That the eastern zone is not swallowed up by the German Federal Republic in so drastic and violent a way as to constitute a major blow to communist and Soviet prestige; that in any possible German settlement the East German communist leaders should have a voice; and that if possible some of the social and economic changes introduced by the communists in East Berlin should be retained;

b. That atomic armaments should not be introduced into the defenses of Western Germany; and

c. That the armed forces of Western Germany, or of a possible united Germany, should not be allied with, and should not constitute an extension of, the armed forces of the United States.

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Glimpses of Testimony in Kefauver's Recent 3-Day Hearings on Administered Prices

"Creeping Admonitionism" No Substitute for Public Control

From the brilliant and witty testimony by Prof. Ben W. Lewis of Oberlin, Jan. 23, to the Kefauver Committee:

"Leaders of business and leaders of labor in recent years have been increasingly admonished to behave like statesmen, to consult their consciences, to seek the general good, to hold their power over prices and wages in check. Admonitions are delivered in the name of our way of life.

"Our way of life, meaning our economic way of life, traditionally is geared to gain, not to goodness. If we were operating on schedule, admonitions marinated in goodness would be as pointless as they are bound to be ineffective.

Economizing by Conscience Inadequate

"May I suggest that creeping admonitionism is wholly foreign to our economic life, and that economizing by conscience is a symptom of, and not a cure for organic disabilities?

"The persistent flow of admonitions strongly suggests a very disturbed state of mind on the part of those in high places—their growing suspicion that things in the economy are getting out of hand and that something needs to be done about it that the free market, unassisted, cannot be expected to accomplish.

"It is quite possible that our admonishers are catching a glimpse of a phenomenon which many observers of the American economy have been commenting on for many years, but increasingly of late:

"In significant proportions, society's economizing decisions are made, out of hand, by relatively few people who sit above the market in key positions within huge conglomerates of economic power. I suggest that the admonishers are beginning to sense the fact that the significance of the possession by a few of great power over the economy, and are pleading that this power be used responsibly in the broad social interest.

Big Business Well Manicured

"The behavior of big business today is spotless, at least no spots remain unremoved for long. Tutored by its attorneys, bathed, barbered and cosmeticized by Madison Avenue, nourished and sanctified by war and cold war, bigness exhibits the gracious assurance that bespeaks status and a clear conscience. Bigness was once the bad boy in Sunday School; now it sits on the vestry. It may not yet have acquired a full-sized soul, but the contract has been let and the press alerted.

"It is urged that, along with the growth of the big corporation as the repository of great economic power, will come the growth of the corporate conscience.

"It isn't going to happen; if it did happen, it wouldn't work; and if it did work, it would still be intolerable to free men. An economy is a mechanism designed to pick up and discharge the wishes of society in the management of its resources; it is not an instrument for the rendering of gracious music by kindly disposed improvisers.

"When 170 million men live and make their living together, the fact that every one of them is equipped with a burning 24-hour conscience does not make less necessary the active presence of an overall organizing and directing force to work out the level and trend and allocation of resource use and the division of profit. To rely for this on the unguided, uncoordinated consciences of the managements of economic blocs is to abandon order as well as human dignity.

"The White House, which wants high production, full employment, healthy wages, abundant profits and low prices, now admonishes industrial statesmen to recognize their public responsibility and to adopt measures 'appropriate.' The management—as allocator, distributor, stabilizer, trustee, conservator, prophet and chaplain, as well as manager—consults its conscience. The diagnosis of the attending psychiatrist will be 'multiple schizophrenia' — the management's personality will not be split, it will be shredded and powdered!

Collective Planning Lies Ahead

"My own prediction is (and I stress that I am predicting, not prescribing) that the years ahead will see a great increase in conscious, collective, governmental controls and of governmental enterprise. The development will reflect a growing intensified concern over the private possession of economic power so vast that even its possessors are frightened by the implications of their holdings.

"Our giant firms are sitting like fat, delectable ducks, virtually inviting the government to open fire with something more effective than anti-trust. The invitation will be accepted."

Per Capita Income Declining

Sen. KEFAUVER. We hear a lot of people say that we have got more money than we had before. If you take current prices in 1955 as compared with 1958, there has been a growth of $39 billion. But if you use 1958 prices, then the national [gross national product]—

Dr. Edwin G. NOURSE (first chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers). Evaporates in inflation.

Sen. KEFAUVER. . . . [as for the] per capita income, if you use the same value of the dollar in 1955, which was $1,790, in 1958 it dropped to $1,784.

Dr. NOURSE. We made a very small gain for the economy as a whole. It was not proportionate to our gain in population, so the individual is actually worse off after the four year period.

—Hearing on Administered Prices, Jan. 23.

Inflation of Last Five Years Due to Controlled or Administered Prices

"I have one more chart which brings this administrative inflation more nearly up to date. This Chart IV carries the inflation from 1953 to October 1958. In this chart I have divided metals and metal products into three categories—steel, steel products and other metal products . . . these steel and steel using groups account for two-thirds of the gross increase in prices shown. This whole area, two-thirds, is represented by the steel and steel-using industries. The administered price groups marked in black account for 85 percent of the gross increase in the wholesale price index.

"If these groups had not gone up in price, the wholesale price index would have risen less than 1 percent, and so far as the wholesale price index is concerned, there would have been no inflation."

—Gardiner C. Means, Jan. 24, to the Kefauver subcommittee study of administered prices.

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Another $327,000 Rammed Through the House Under Gag Rule Without Debate or Roll Call

The Un-Americans (Fittingly) Get More Money by Un-American Procedure

Under a gag rule procedure about as American as a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, the House Un-American Activities Committee got itself another $327,000, more than any other House Committee except multifarious Government Operations. The amount asked was approved by House Administrations Committee without the public hearing its chairman, Omar Burleson of Texas, has often promised, and reported to the floor of the House under a privileged rule allowing neither amendment nor debate. Mr. Burleson even arose to remind the bill's manager that Speaker Rayburn had ruled he need not recognize any member who asked for the floor without first requiring that member to state his intention, and refusing him the right to speak if he did not approve.

The bill's manager, Friedel of Maryland, nevertheless allowed Congressman James Roosevelt of California to state for the record that he would have moved to reduce the amount asked if amendments had been permitted, and that he would still press the chairman of the Rules committee for hearing on his bill to abolish the Un-American Committee. Since the Chairman is Smith of Virginia, father of the Smith Act, long a card-carrying anti-Communist, the prospects for a full and fair public hearing are about as promising as a motion to admit Mrs. Daisy Bates to the Daughters of the Confederacy.

Friedel magnanimously allowed Wier of Minnesota, last of the public dissenters against the Un-Americans, to say that this time like last he would have voted "no" if a vote had been permitted. Then, without another voice being raised, the Speaker called the question and "the resolution was agreed to, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table." The un-American procedure of the House nicely matched the un-American preconceptions of the Committee.

On the Senate side the same date, Jan. 29, the Committee on Rules and Administration approved an appropriation of $224,000 for the other witch hunting committee, Senate Internal Security. This will probably be approved by the Senate before we get to press with as little debate as in the House. The President's budget, we notice, asks $400,000 for the Subversive Activities Control Board. Between these three groups, and the FBI's own informer stable, there should be ample funds to save from the breadline that dwindling battalion of ex-Communists, anti-Communist frenetics, adventurers, moochers and plain "nuts" who use the witch hunt as their private WPA, raking over the dead leaves of the *Daily Worker*.

Those liberals foolish enough to be pressing for postal censorship of "hate mail" (*remember* the Un-American Activities Committee began with a liberal resolution to expose Nazis, anti-Semites and Fascists) should take note of House Res. 78 called up by Smith of Virginia and passed by the House without objection a few minutes before its action on House Un-American. This authorizes an investigation into "the mailability of articles . . . which reasonably may be expected to arouse or activate racial, religious, or class hatred or animosity." This too will be no monument to Jeffersonianism.

Brighter Civil Liberties News

While the Administration is preparing new restrictive travel legislation, Senators Humphrey and Hennings (supported initially by Chavez, Anderson, Symington, Morse and Neuberger) have introduced a bill, S 806, to protect the right to travel. It says "no tests of beliefs or associations shall be applied to issuance of passports." The bill would forbid the State Department to shut off certain countries from travel in peacetime. Faceless informers would be barred in passport hearings. The only political restrictions would be those in the Internal Security Act of 1950 still to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. This Act forbids travel by members of organizations under final orders to register with the Subversive Activities Control Board. No such order has yet been upheld.

Senator Kennedy (with Clark of Penn.) has introduced a bill, S 819, to take loyalty oath provisions out of the National Defense Education Act of 1958. These originated with an amendment by Senator Mundt and have been protested by many college heads, including those of Yale, Harvard and Princeton. This is the first time Kennedy, strikingly silent during McCarthyism, has spoken up for civil liberty.

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